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This paper analyzes tax/subsidy competition and transfer pricing regulation between govern-
ments involved in trade through a multinational ﬁrm and a joint venture using an input provided
by the former. The paper takes into account the fact that in absence of bargaining, any model of
such JV is discontinuous in the ownership distribution in that for diﬀerent ownership distributions,
control is either fully held by one party, or no party in particular. The paper therefore model con-
trol problems that are inherent to JVs without strongly dominant shareholder and provides along
the way a rationale for indigenization policies that restrict foreign ownership.
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11 Introduction
There is a large literature on international transfer pricing and tax competition. This literature has
overlooked two important aspects. Firstly, while it extensively focused on ﬁrms’ transfer pricing policy,
little has been done to analyze government’s transfer pricing policy (TPP). Indeed, many countries
have a transfer pricing policy, which the ﬁrm should obey when pricing internal transactions. If one
takes a closer look to the number of (court) cases between transfer pricing regulators and Multinational
ﬁrms (MNF), it then becomes clear that TPP are set to be complied with1. Secondly, many of the
transactions implying transfer pricing take place between a multinational ﬁrm, and a joint venture
(instead of a fully-owned subsidiary) because of MNF’s ownership restrictions (often referred to as
indigenization policy) that many countries-especially developing-impose2. A fundamental issue which
arises then is which party in the joint venture (JV) makes production decision? Production decision
(either by local ﬁrms or by MNF) has a fundamental impact on government’s policies (transfer pricing,
taxation), and vice-versa.
JV in which MNF are involved usually have a special feature. It often happen that at least, one
input is provided by the MNF3. Therefore, while any non input-supplying party in the venture would
(if in control) take production decision that maximizes the proﬁt of the JV, the MNF (if in control)
will instead attempt to maximize its joint proﬁt, that is, transfer pricing revenue plus its share of
proﬁt in the JV4. Recognizing this fact, one should expect conﬂicts within any JV in witch one of the
parties supplies an input, especially when there is no (strongly) dominant shareholder as is the case
in countries with an indigenization policy. Such kind of conﬂicts can be resolved (or worsened) by
government’s policies related to transfer pricing, taxation and/or subsidization.
In this paper, I combine some issues that have been little analyzed in the literature, usually
separately. In particular, I look at optimal transfer pricing regulations and tax/subsidy policies for
governments involved in trade through an MNF and JV. Acknowledging control issues, I model the
conﬂict that arise between the MNF and local shareholders whose only interest is in the JV, rather
than taking control (by one party) as exogenous. Along the way, the paper provides a rationale for
ownership restriction. While my setting can be characteristic of any two countries involved in trade, it
is more descriptive of trade situations that involve a developed and a developing country. Furthermore,
our model provides predictions that can be tested empirically.
1In April of 1992, then Chief Tax Court Judge Arthur L. Nims III stated that his court had a backlog of section
482 cases with an amount in controversy of $32 billion and that the amount had doubled in two or three years. These
ﬁgures are the tip of an iceberg; according to the IRS, about 90% of contested section 482 adjustments are settled at the
appeals level, without going to court.” Statement of Robert S. McIntyre, Director, Citizens for Tax Justice,
& Michael J. McIntyre, Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School
Before the Senate Committee on Government Aﬀairs
On the Breakdown of IRS tax enforcement regarding multinational corporations:
revenue loss, excessive litigation, and unfair burdens for U.S. producers. March 25, 1993
2Many developing countries have a policy that allows foreign direct investment (FDI) only through ventures with
local ﬁrms (see Svejnar and Smith, 1984 for examples).
3This input can be a technology over which the MNF has a patent, or a common input which can be found in the
market but supplied by the MNF as part of conditions to enter the venture.
4This was already noted by Falvey and Fried (1986). It could be that a more advantageous scheme for the MNF is to
oﬀer to the shareholders of the foreign subsidiary a combination of equities in both subsidiaries, against the authorization
to maximize global proﬁt. However, to the best of my knowledge, this kind of arrangement is not observed.
2The importance of FDI for host countries (especially developing countries) is unquestionable.
Growingly, foreign ownership in these JV is often limited for reasons which are not yet totally under-
stood by academics. A common explanation for such restriction policy, is to shift control to local ﬁrms.
However, such explanation is not fully satisfactory, for two simple reasons. Firstly, for some ownership
range, no formal relation between ownership and control exists. It is even claimed that MNF often
have control in JV in which they do not have majority ownership. Secondly, is control by local parties
always associated with higher beneﬁts for the country? One thing is however undeniable: limiting
MNF’s ownership share increases the bargaining power of local ﬁrms. This means that although they
might not be in total control, they have a minimum to say in the JV’s management. Groot and Mer-
chant report that “Morris (1998), for example, noted that JVs require special cooperation, because no
one party has total control...” They further add that “Gordon Redding, director of the university of
Hong Kong Business School, estimated that “About 50% of joint ventures fail”(Young, 1994, p.35)”
and argue that control problems have been suggested by some authors as being at the origin of such
failures. Svejnar and Smith (1984) note that “For example, Dymsza [1972, pp.206-07] warns that
the TNC has to “share control, as well as proﬁts” and bargain with their local partners over crucial
managerial issues including sources of inputs, payments of dividends, and transfer pricing.” Therefore,
regarding the intrinsic conﬂict between the MNF’s objectives and that of the JV, more ownership by
local partners can allow them to veto an MNF’s production (and hence input purchasing) decision
that clearly is intended to beneﬁt it, rather that the JV in which they are involved. For instance, on
the web site of the Indian ministry of ﬁnance, a report on FDI5 notes the following
Thought 100 percent FDI is allowed in private petroleum reﬁneries, FDI in public sector reﬁneries is
restricted to 26 percent. The public sector reﬁneries are under the control of government appointed
boards. Government as owner has the right to decide how much if any of its shares it wants to sell
to a domestic or foreign investor. Further, as long as these reﬁneries remain in the public sector
government either has management control (50.1 percent) or the right to veto any fundamental
changes (25.1 percent equity).25
Footnote 25. It can even have management control with 25 percent share.
In order to provide a theory of ownership restriction, one has to compare diﬀerent models. In
other words, any model in which two parties in a JV have diﬀerent objectives is discontinuous in
the ownership share. For instance, assuming that party A makes decisions, and trying to derive
an optimal ownership distribution can be a wrong methodology. It could well be that the optimal
ownership distribution is such that party B has 98% ownership, which very likely provides control
over the JV. In this case, the optimal ownership derived is irrelevant since it is based on the wrong
control assumption. This point is illustrated in Falvey and Fried (1984) in which the authors claim at
some point that “One could in principle compute an ‘optimal’ indigenization level, with the additional
constraint that the domestic ownership share must allow host control of the subsidiary” (host control
being their working assumption). Although for some levels of ownership (close to zero or one) there
is no ambiguity about who is in control, there is no formal relation between ownership and control for
intermediate levels of ownership (footnote 25 of the quotation above perfectly illustrates this). Since
some indigenization policies restrict foreign equity to 50%, the diﬃculty of knowing which party is
then in control is obvious. But at the same time, picking randomly one party as being in control can
imply misleading results.
When control is unambiguously held by one party, then outcomes are easily determined. When
5See http://planningcommission.nic.in/aboutus/committee/strgrp/stgp fdi.pdf p. 41
3no one party in particular has control, then it is diﬃcult for the researcher to predict who will make
decisions in the JV. Building on the evidence of conﬂicts in JV, I propose a simple rule that determines
which party is in control in equilibrium when no one party has ex-ante total control. I analyze one
aspect of control problems that might arise in joint ventures: control over production, or equivalently
input purchasing. Although not being the whole problem in JVs, it is the one that seems the most
obvious just by looking at the objective of both parties in the JV. Trivially, unless a coincidence, the
proﬁt maximizing level of input/output will be diﬀerent depending on which party is in control. This
implies that the input amount that the MNF would like to sell to the JV (exportation) diﬀers from
the one that maximizes the proﬁt of the JV and hence the local partner (importations). Building on
the evidence about control problems, I therefore assume that such conﬂict gets resolved by the law of
supply and demand. This means that, if we assume that bargaining is ineﬀective6, the MNF and the
JV end up exchanging the minimum out of the two input maximizing levels for each party. Therefore,
the party which needs to buy/sell less inputs in the end gets control over input purchasing, and hence
production decision7.
They are several factors which aﬀect the optimal input supply (demand) by the MNF (JV). Some
are exogenous, like the cost characteristics of producing the inputs, demand characteristics in the
market for ﬁnal good, etc. Some other factors are endogenous and depend on countries policies,
like tax/subsidy, ownership distribution and transfer pricing policies. This means that through their
policies governments are able to shift control to one party by inﬂuencing the optimal input sup-
ply/demand, or equivalently the optimal export by MNF and import by the JV. For instance, transfer
pricing regulations have a strong inﬂuence on import/export. If the transfer price is high (low), then
the optimal import for the JV will very likely be lower (higher) than the optimal export for the
MNE, shifting control to the JV (MNF). Similarly, taxes and subsidies have a strong inﬂuence on
importations/exportations.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a revue of the literature that relates
to this paper. Section 3 introduces the model. Section 4 deals with a model of ownership distribution
for which no party in a JV has total control. This model is compared in section 5 with models of
full control by one of the parties, providing a rationale for indigenization. Section 6 discuses some
empirical facts and relates them to our results. Section 7 concludes.
2 Related literature
Our paper is related to several earlier works. In this literature, we can distinguish between two
mainstreams. On one hand, there are models that involve an MNF, its JV partner (or subsidiary),
and the JV’s host government. In the other type of model, there is an extra player which is the MNF’s
government.
Along the ﬁrst type of model, we can make a further distinction depending on whether governments
are passive (exogenous policies) or active (endogenous policy). Svejnar and Smith (1984) develop a
bargaining model between an MNF, its JV partner and the JV’s host government. Their model
6That might explain the high failure rates in JV mentioned earlier by Gordon Redding.
7With respect to the alternative of bargaining, such a situation is equivalent to a Prisoner’s dilemma for particular
values of bargaining power that would make each party better oﬀ if bargaining was to take place.
4includes both the endogenous aspect (when host government is a bargainer) and the exogenous aspect
(when bargaining takes place between the MNF and its local partner only). In their model, the
host government does not control transfer pricing, and control issues are solved by bargaining. The
JV always generates the largest possible proﬁt, and allocates it to the three parties according to
their bargaining power. One of their main ﬁnding is that the JV’s institutionally determined share
is irrelevant to the distribution of after-tax proﬁts, a feature that also holds in our model where
bargaining power is about control over input purchase, tax/subsidy, and transfer pricing. In a model
with exogenous governments’ policies, Falvey and Fried (1986) show that indigenization can be a good
policy against MNF’s transfer pricing policy that shift income away from the host (high tax) country,
when in the form of domestic portofolio (without eﬀect on MNF’s control). When indigenization shifts
control to local ﬁrms, then the MNF’s substitution possibilities are reduced in that more local input
is used.
Al Saadon and Das (1996) analyze a setting similar to Svejnar and Smith. They analyze diﬀerent
game sequences, depending on whether the diﬀerent parties set their policies prior or after ownership
shares are negotiated (commitment vs no commitment). The host country either sets a tax/subsidy
policy while the MNF’s transfer pricing is exogenous, or vice versa. Ownership shares are determined
in the bargaining process. They ﬁnd that both the host country and the MNF prefer no commitment
to commitment. However, Al Saadon and Das derive an equilibrium ownership distribution, based
on the assumption that the local partners have control over production decision, which per se puts
a constraint on ownership distribution. This problem does not arise in Svejnar and Smith because
production is negotiated, while only ownership shares are negotiated in Al Saadon and Das.
Along the second type of models, Scharf and Raimondos-Mller (2000) and Mansori and Wichen-
rieder (1999) analyze competition between governments in setting their transfer pricing regulations.
In both papers, taxes are exogenous, and the MNF has to comply with two transfer prices, one in each
country. Also, they deal with fully owned subsidiaries, which implies that control issues are absent.
Although dealing with games of complete and symmetric information, this paper also relates to
the literature on incentive regulation of transfer pricing. See Prusa (1990), Gresik and Nelson (1994)
and Elitzur and Mintz (1996) among others.
Our paper contributes to the literature by combining in the same model, the diﬀerent issues
analyzed by the papers cited here-above (ownership distribution, control issues, tax competition and
transfer pricing regulation)
3 The model
The ﬁrms A multinational ﬁrm based in a domestic country (country d) produces an amount q
of an intermediate good at constant marginal cost θ. The good is transferred to a another ﬁrm
located in a foreign (host) country (country f) at a unit (transfer) price t. The foreign ﬁrm is either
a partially-owned foreign subsidiary, or a joint venture (we will use the two terms interchangeably).
The domestic ﬁrm owns a share 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 in the venture. A local partner in country f own the share
(1 − δ). Obviously, we only consider voting shares.
The foreign subsidiary, which is a monopolist, turns the intermediate good into a ﬁnal good at a
cost (normalized to) zero. The ﬁnal good is then sold in the local market where prevails an inverse
5demand function P(q) = a − bq, bringing revenues R(q) = P(q)q.
The (after-tax) proﬁts of the MNF and the JV can be expressed as
πd(q) = (t − θ)q − Td(q) + δπf (1)
πf(qf) = R(qf) − (θf + t)qf − Tf(q) (2)
where Ti(q) is the tax (subsidy) paid by (to) the ﬁrm in country i. (more on this later)
Control in the joint venture We shall analyze 3 diﬀerent scenarios. The ﬁrst two correspond to
the case in which control is unambiguously exerted by one party (MNF or local partner). Although the
numbers themselves are irrelevant for our analysis, one could assume this range to be δ ∈ [0,25%] or
δ ∈ [75,100%]. In the third scenario, the right to make production decision is endogenous, because no
party has ex-ante total control (one could assume this range to be δ ∈]25%,75%[). Speciﬁcally, when
the quantity that the domestic ﬁrm would like to sell to the joint venture diﬀers from the quantity
that this latter would like to buy from the former, then the quantity exchanged will simply be the
minimum of the two quantities. Notice that our equilibrium concept of control is equivalent to saying
that for some ownership distribution, the party on the short side of the ‘market’ has full bargaining
power
The governments Each branch of the MNF is under the jurisdiction of the government in the
country it operates. Governments set a tax/subsidy contingent on output Ti(q). Later on, we will
see that for the domestic country only, such tax has the same characteristics as a proportional tax
(standard in developed countries). This is not true for the foreign government. Indeed, many devel-
oping countries negotiate tax liabilities with MNFs based on the amount of capital invested in the
country, the jobs created etc. All these variables are likely proportional to output. The objective of
each government is to maximize social welfare, that is, consumers’ net surplus (only for government
f) plus tax revenues, plus the proﬁt of the local ﬁrm.




P(x)dx − R(q) + Tf(q) + λf(1 − δ)πf,
where 0 ≤ λi ≤ 1 is the weight given to the local ﬁrm’s proﬁt by government Gi.
The transfer pricing authority In the ﬁrst stage of the game, one of the two governments sets a
transfer pricing policy by maximizing the same welfare function as in the tax game of the second stage.
The model therefore diﬀerentiate itself from existing literature in which the ﬁrm’s proﬁt is calculated
using two diﬀerent transfer prices set by the two countries as in Scharf and Raimondos-Mller (2000)
and Mansori and Weichenrieder (1999). In these models, double taxation occur in equilibrium only
because the MNF faces two transfer prices. However, as the existence of Advance Pricing Agreements
suggest, most tax authorities are concerned with double taxation especially when they have signed
6agreements to avoid double taxation (as it is the case with many countries)8. Empirically, there is
no evidence about which country’s TPP prevails when two countries’ policies lead a ﬁrm to face two
diﬀerent prices. However, we shall discuss diﬀerent cases, depending on which country’s TPP prevails.
We make the following assumptions:
Assumption A1: a − θ > 0, and λδ < 1
The ﬁrst inequality is standard and ensures that the quantity exchanged in equilibrium is strictly
positive, i.e. that trade occurs. The second inequality ensures that transfer prices and social welfare
are always determined. Given that λ ≤ 1 and δ ≤ 1, it states that we never have simultaneously
λ = δ = 1.
Without any precision, Indigenization refers to any restriction on foreign ownership. We introduce
the following deﬁnitions (notation)
Deﬁnition 1 Partial Indigenization refers to the situation in which foreign ownership is restricted in
such a way that the MNF still has full control.
Deﬁnition 2 Semi Indigenization refers to the situation in which foreign ownership is restricted in
such a way that no one party in the JV has ex-ante full control.
Deﬁnition 3 Full Indigenization refers to the situation in which foreign ownership is restricted in
such a way that the local partner gets full control.
Let us summarize the timing of the game.
• Stage 1: The transfer price is set by the authority in charge (Gf or Gd)
• Stage 2: After having observed the transfer price (which is publicly revealed), government Gi
sets its tax/subsidy policy Ti(q), where q is the quantity exchanged between the two countries.
• Stage 3: Each ﬁrm chooses its strategy, namely the quantity to export (MNF) and to import
(JV).
4 Optimal policies under Semi Indigenization
We shall solve the game by backward induction. We ﬁrst determine the equilibrium of the sup-
ply/demand game between the MNF and the JV for a given (unique) transfer price, and tax/subsidy
policies by the two governments. Then we determine the governments tax/subsidy policy for a given
transfer price, and ﬁnally, the transfer pricing policy by the government whose transfer pricing policy
prevails. However, as we shall see, it will be not possible to know the second and third stage equi-
librium before solving the ﬁrst stage game. Indeed, the outcome of the second stage depends on the
transfer price that will be set in the ﬁrst stage.
8Furthermore, double taxation through diﬀerent transfer prices presents a fundamental diﬀerence with double taxation
through proportional corporate tax rates (with a single transfer price): Assuming no tax diﬀerentials, the former case
can imply negative proﬁts even if under a unique transfer price double taxation would imply positive proﬁts.
74.1 Production strategies
Before solving for the quantity equilibrium, it is necessary to ﬁrst determine the player’s set of strate-
gies. Each ﬁrm can play any strategy q in (0,+∞). However, it is important to notice that in our
model, the production strategy of a ﬁrm, and that of its tax authority are equivalent. The reason is
that, having the advantage of being ﬁrst-movers, tax authorities set their policy in such a way that
they induce their ﬁrms to behave in the desired way. Therefore, when talking about quantity strategy,
we shall often assimilate a ﬁrm with its government and vice-versa.
We make the following assumption:
Assumption A2: The MNF and the JV do not play dominated strategies.
We are ﬁrst going to show that each government has dominated strategies within its strategy set.
The following lemma helps us in doing so.
Lemma 1 There exists qf and qd such that SWf is concave and single-peaked at qf and SWd is
concave and single-peaked at qd. Therefore, both countries’ welfare are increasing in q on the interval
(0,min{qf,qd})




s.t. (i) πd − δπf ≥ πd
(ii) q∗ ∈ argmax{πd(q)}
Constraint (i) is an individually rational constraint. It states that the after-tax proﬁt of the MNF
has to be at least equal to the after tax proﬁt that the ﬁrm would be able to make in another country
with equivalent business conditions. For simplicity, this outside opportunity is assumed to be constant,
i.e. independent of the MNF’s proﬁt in the domestic country 9. This captures the strategic eﬀect of
tax setting by governments. Notice that the taxable income of the MNF in country d is net of the
after-tax share of proﬁt in country f meaning that double taxation does not occur. Our results are
qualitatively unaﬀected and quantitatively little aﬀected if we had assumed double taxation10. This
however, would not be true if double taxation would occur because of diﬀerent transfer prices imposed
by each government.
Constraint (ii) is the MNF’s reaction function to the transfer price and the tax policies in both
countries
9The fact that the outside opportunity is constant is also consistent with the fact that some governments negotiate in
advance with ﬁrms about the amount of taxes that will be paid in a given period. This is especially true with developing
countries, but also with some developed countries. For instance, the Primarolo report about harmful tax practices in
Europe list the case of The Netherlands that secretly negotiate taxes in advance. In this case, the ﬁxed part a non linear
tax (based on production) ensures that the ﬁrm is left with the negotiated after-tax proﬁt agreed upon, while the slope
of the tax is used to provide the right production incentive to the ﬁrm.
10In a previous version of this paper, I assumed double taxation. I also used a more general model in which the
intermediate good was also sold in the domestic market, leading the domestic government to also consider consumer’s
surplus. Moreover, I assumed a common (and convex) cost function for the MNF, instead of the linear cost used here.
None of the qualitative results obtained in the current version diﬀer from those obtained in the previous (more general)
model.
8As we are under complete (and symmetric) information, it can be shown that the above program
is equivalent to a modiﬁed program in which constraint (ii) is dropped and the government directly





s.t. πd − δπf ≥ πd
Substituting Td using (1), the objective of government Gd can then be rewritten as:
max
q,πd
(t − θ)q + δ [R(q) − tq − Tf] − (1 − λd)πd
s.t. πd − δπf ≥ πd
Since proﬁt is costly (πd negatively aﬀect social welfare), Gd will leave the minimal (after-tax)
proﬁt to the MNF, and the individually rational constraint will be binding, meaning that the MNF
is left with a rent equal to its share of foreign after-tax proﬁt plus its outside opportunity. Without
loss of generality, we normalize the outside opportunity πd to zero. Substituting πd from the binding
IR constraint, the program of Gd ﬁnally becomes
max
q (t − θ)q + δλd [R(q) − tq − Tf] (3)
Maximizing with respect to q yields12:
δλdR0(qd) = θ − (1 − δλd)t (4)
To ﬁnd qf, we perform for government Gf a similar exercise. After the same manipulations as





P(x)dx − tq − [1 − (1 − δ)λd]πf
subject to πf ≥ πf
where πf is the outside opportunity of the JV.
Again, as proﬁt is costly, Gf will leave the minimal rent to the JV, i.e πf. Normalizing πf to zero,






Solving this program yields13
P(qf) = t (5)
The socially optimal policy implies marginal cost pricing (recall that the only cost of the JV is
t). Therefore, when production equals qf, the JV makes a before-tax proﬁt equal to zero. This
11It is a simple exercise to determine the tax Td(q) which will achieve the same outcome as the solution of the modiﬁed
program in which lump sum tax is used. The slope of the tax function is used to induce the ﬁrm to select the tax
authority’s optimal production, and the ﬁxed part is used to set the ﬁrm’s rent at the desired level. This exercise is
performed later on.
12The second order condition is R
00(q) < 0, which is satisﬁed by assumption.
13The second order condition is P
0(q) < 0, which is satisﬁed, and hence the concavity.
9result is due to the simplifying assumption that the same weight is given to consumer’s surplus and
tax revenues14 and is especially realistic when the JV sells a basic (or vital) product for which the
government has a particular concern to make it available to as many consumers as possible (drugs for
instance), or when the JV is a public utility provider. Note that in this case, the JV does not make a
net proﬁt equal to zero. In order to meet the participation constraint, the foreign government needs
to provide the JV with a subsidy, as long as its outside opportunity is strictly positive (we come back
on this later).
Given that in equilibrium πf = 0, λf has no inﬂuence in our model. Therefore, to simplify nota-
tion, we shall denote λd ≡ λ.
The quantity qd (qf) is what the domestic (foreign) tax authorities ideally would like to induce the
MNF (the JV) to export (respectively import). However, each ﬁrm can in equilibrium be rationed by
the other. Given assumption A2 and lemma 1, each government’s set of strategies shrinks to the pair
(qf,qd). In fact, both governments will induce their ﬁrm to play min(qf,qd) in equilibrium (remember
that in the second stage, the minimum of the two quantities is known). It is therefore never optimal
to play less than min(qf,qd), as this strategy is dominated (last statement of lemma 1), and playing
more than min(qf,qd) does not aﬀect the equilibrium outcome.
For a given transfer price, which of qf or qd determines the equilibrium value of q? At this point,
it is not yet possible to determine the second stage (or quantity) equilibrium as it depends on the













This remark has some important implications. It indeed reﬂect all the tradeoﬀs that a government
faces when setting its TPP in the ﬁrst stage of the game (which we solve in the next subsection). Let
us ﬁrst examine the tradeoﬀ government Gd faces. Because transfer pricing revenue positively enters
the proﬁt of the domestic ﬁrm15, which in turn is valued by Gd, a high transfer price implies high
welfare, ceteris paribus. However, a high transfer price would also have the eﬀect that the MNF wants
to sell more in the second stage (qd high), and the JV to buy less (qf low), making it more likely that
the quantity exchanged will be qf. As a consequence, transfer pricing revenues (tqf) might decrease
because although t is high, the quantity exchanged in equilibrium might be too low. Depending on
the net eﬀect, Gd might want either a high or a low t. In the next subsection, we give to the terms
“high” and “low” a more explicit meaning.
For Gf, the eﬀects are simpler. The transfer price acts as an additional cost to the subsidiary,
which implies that Gf might want a low transfer price, at ﬁrst sight. However, a low t increases qf
and decreases qd, making it more likely that qd will be the equilibrium quantity exchanged. This is
bad news for Gf since the quantity sold in its local market will be smaller, and so will be consumers’
net surplus. Again, depending on which eﬀect dominates, Gf might either set a low or a high transfer
price.
14Had we put a weight α ≤ 1 to tax revenues, we would have diﬀerent market situations ranging from monopoly
outcome (α = 0) to the one of perfect competition obtained here (α = 1).
15For a given production q,
∂πd
∂t = (1 − δ)q > 0.
104.2 Optimal transfer pricing policy
We now turn to the issue of which transfer price a government will impose, if given the authority to
control the transfer price. Let t denotes the transfer price which clears the (international) market, i.e
which is such that qd = qf.
The government which sets the transfer price has two possibilities. It can set a transfer price
smaller than t, in which case the quantity exchanged will be qd; or, it can set a transfer price larger
than t, in which case the quantity exchanged will be qf. The following result is obtained:
Lemma 2 Let ti denote the optimal transfer price that government Gi would set if given the transfer






λδa(1 − 3λδ) + θ(1 + λδ)
(1 − λδ)(1 + 3λδ)
< t.
Both td and tf lead to strictly positive productions in both countries.
Proof. See Appendix A
(In the remainder of the paper, most proofs will use some results derived in the proof of lemma 2.)
To ﬁnd the optimal transfer that Gi will set in the ﬁrst stage, we proceed in the following way:
ﬁnd the optimal transfer price within the range (0, t), then within the range (t, +∞). We proceed
this way because there is a non-diﬀerentiability in each government’s welfare function at t = t, due
to the equilibrium concept we use here, i.e the min criterium. We then compare social welfare under
the two optimal prices in each range. For government Gf, we ﬁnd that welfare is higher under the
optimal transfer price in the range (0, t), which we denoted tf. For government Gd, it is found that
welfare is higher under the optimal transfer price in the range (t, +∞), denoted td.
The optimal transfer pricing policy of the domestic government coincides with the policy that the
MNF would have chosen, if it was free to set its transfer price. Indeed, since the after tax proﬁt of
the foreign subsidiary is nil in equilibrium, from (3) we see that the objective of the transfer pricing
authority and that of the MNF are the same. Therefore, whenever we talk about the TPP of the
domestic government, the reader should keep in mind that it is equivalent to that of the MNF. This
relation does not hold between the JV and the foreign government. We discuss these patterns in more
detail in the third paragraph of subsection 5.1 (see also footnote 18)
The implications of lemma 2 are summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 1 Assume that the host government’s transfer pricing policy prevails. In equilibrium,
the MNF will have control over the JV. On the contrary, local ﬁrms will have control over the JV if
the transfer pricing policy of the domestic country prevails.
Proposition 1 is somewhat surprising. One would have expected that each government would choose
the transfer price such that its importations (or exportations) will not be rationed, or equivalently
to provide its ﬁrm with control. However, avoiding the rationing is socially expensive. For instance,
if government Gf wants to have the JV importing the socially optimal quantity qf, and avoid being
11rationed by the parent ﬁrm, it would have to accept setting a high transfer price. But a high transfer
price is also synonym of a high cost, and government f in the end prefers that the subsidiary be
rationed and in this way, it will have a larger freedom to set a lower transfer price.
We now relate the analysis to the discussion at the end of the previous subsection (about the
tradeoﬀs faced by a government). We can conclude that for government Gf, the cost-cutting eﬀect
(implied by a low transfer price) is larger than the quantity decrease eﬀect (implied by a high transfer
price). For government Gd, the revenue eﬀect from a high transfer price is higher than the quantity
eﬀect from less exportation.
An interesting implication of proposition 1 is that under the TPP of the domestic government,
high restrictions on MNF’s ownership are not necessary to transfer full control to the local partner. If
the local partner has just enough (voting) shares such that it can veto an MNF’s decision, then it will
have full control in equilibrium. This might explain (among others) why most indigenization policies
do not limit foreign equity to very small participation (below 25 percent for example).
Finally, contrary to the usual international transfer pricing models, we do not obtain the “bang-
bang” result. Put diﬀerently, it is not the case in our model that the exporting government wants
an inﬁnite transfer price, and the importing government a zero transfer price. In fact, as we shall
see later, the transfer pricing policy of the importing government turns out to be quite surprising for
certain level of ownership share.
4.3 Optimal tax/subsidy policies
In this subsection only, we remove the assumption of the outside opportunities being normalized to
zero. We analyze governments choice related to tax versus subsidy. We perform this analysis under
the TPP of the domestic government. As said earlier, it is a simple exercise to show that the optimal
allocations (Ti,qi), i = d,f, can be replicated by a non linear tax Ti(qi). For example, when the TPP
of the domestic government prevails, the foreign non linear tax would have a ﬁxed component and a
(negative) quadratic component, implying higher ‘discount’ in tax liabilities for higher productions.
Assume that government Gi oﬀers the non linear tax schedule Ti(q) where q is the quantity ex-
changed in equilibrium. Under the TPP of the domestic government, q = qf.
The maximization program of the JV is
max
q R(q) − tdq − Tf(q)
The FOC of this program is
P(q) + qP0(q) − td − T
0
f(q) = 0




f(q) = qP0(q) = −bq (6)
Since the foreign government values consumer’s welfare, the only way to encourage the JV to
produce the (high) competitive output level is to oﬀer a tax schedule which is decreasing in output,
which explains that T
0
f(.) is negative.
12Therefore, the non linear tax oﬀered by Gf is of the form Tf(q) = α− b
2q2, where α is set to leave
the JV with its outside opportunity, i.e





Similarly, the FOC of the MNF’s optimization program is
td − θ − T
0
d(q) + δ[P(q) + qP0(q) − td − T
0
f(q)] = 0,
which coincides with (5) iﬀ
P(q) − θ − T
0
d(q) + δ[P(q) + qP0(q) − td − T
0
f(q)] = 0,
Taking into account the equilibrium value of T
0
f(q) given in (6), it simpliﬁes to
(1 + δ)P(q) − (θ + δtd) = T
0
d(q), (7)
Unlike the foreign government, the tax liabilities of the MNF increase in production under the
domestic government tax policy. Indeed, strictly considering productions on the increasing part of the
MNF’s proﬁt function, we have that P(q) ≥ td > θ for any production level in [0,qf] because of the
fact that P0(q) < 0 (the ﬁrst inequality being binding at the optimum q = qf). This implies that the
LHS of (7) is strictly positive. The intuition for this is the following. Because the transfer price td is
high, the MNF wants to sell a high quantity to the JV (higher than qf). So if the domestic government
wants to induce the MNF to select the (smaller) preferred input level qf, he has to discourage it from
selecting the high level. This is done by setting a tax schedule which is increasing in the input level
exported to the JV.
The tax schedule of the domestic government is of the form Td(q) = β + [(1 + δ)a − (θ + δt)]q −
(1 + δ)b
2q2, where again β is set such that the MNF is left with its outside opportunity at q = qf.
Note that both governments’ tax schedules are quadratic, and the quadratic terms have a negative
coeﬃcient. This means that both governments oﬀer some tax discount for high production levels.
At this point, it is important to notice that the characteristics of the tax schedules are consistent
with what we commonly observe. Indeed, most developing countries put a high weigh on MNF’s
production level, as high production is likely synonym of high employment, high investment level, and
lower prices. Because of all these beneﬁts, developing countries provide MNFs with all sort of tax
advantages depending on how much money the MNF will invest, how many jobs it will create etc. On
the contrary, since the MNF’s domestic part of proﬁt (transfer pricing revenues) is increasing in q, the
fact that T
0
d(q) > 0 implies that the higher the MNF’s domestic part of proﬁt, the higher the taxes it
pays. This is characteristic of proportional taxes which are implemented by most developed countries.
Now, another interesting issue relates to wether governments oﬀer in aggregate a tax or a subsidy,
i.e to the sign and magnitude of the ﬁxed part of the tax schedules.
Proposition 2 The foreign government provides a subsidy to the JV iﬀ the TPP of the domestic
government prevails. Otherwise he provides a subsidy to the JV if its before-tax proﬁt is smaller
than its outside opportunity, and collects strictly positive tax revenues in the opposite case. The
domestic government provides a a subsidy to the MNF if its before-tax proﬁt is smaller than its outside
opportunity, and collects strictly positive tax revenues in the opposite case.
13When the TPP of the domestic government prevails, the quantity exchanged qf is such that the
JV makes a before-tax proﬁt equal to zero. The foreign government must therefore provide a subsidy
in order to meet the participation constraint of the JV. When the TPP of the foreign government
prevails, the quantity exchanged qd is smaller than the competitive quantity qf, meaning that the JV
makes a strictly positive before-tax proﬁt. Once the outside opportunity is deducted, the net income
becomes taxable if positive, and subsidized if negative. Regarding the MNF, it always gets the share δ
of the JV’s outside opportunity plus the transfer pricing revenues net of production cost. This income
is taxable or subsidized depending on whether it is higher or lower than its outside opportunity.
In practice, MNFs have a higher bargaining power with developing countries than with developed
countries. The reason is that developing countries value more capital, and there are many of them
which compete to attract foreign capital. It is then fairly reasonable to assert that the JV’s outside
opportunity is likely high while that of the MNF is likely low. Furthermore, since it is more likely
that developed countries’ TPP prevail (we discuss this issue later), we obtain the realistic pattern that
MNFs are more likely to get subsidies in developing countries while they are more likely to be taxed
in their home countries.
5 Providing a rationale for indigenization
Now, let us try to provide a rationale to the indigenization policy. In order to do so, one needs ﬁrst to
know which country’s transfer pricing regulations prevails. It is very hard to ﬁnd evidence about this
issue. All what one knows is that some transfer pricing methods seem to be accepted unanimously.
This is the case of the arm’s length method and the cost plus method, this latter being the most used
method according to an estimation by Benvignati (1985). These two methods are used by the IRS
(the tax authority in the US) and the OECD transfer pricing guidelines.
However, it seems that developed countries (especially the US), are able to impose their TPP
internationally. For instance, in a survey by Elliot and Emmanuel, the authors emphasize the inﬂuence
of the IRS and Inland Revenue (tax authority in the UK) at international level. They report that
Companies 2,5,8 and 9 (which have US parent companies) have all implemented policies to comply
with US requirements. In relation to documentation, company 2 has adopted the IRS regulations
on document retention as group policy for all subsidiaries (“This is the policy that we follow for
US purposes and we feel that this will be good anywhere else)”... emphasis by the author.
and later, about another company
“The group operates on the basis that if the Inland Revenue and the IRS can be satisﬁed, then a
comparable level of documentation should be adequate for overseas tax jusrisdictions”. emphasis by
the author
We shall ﬁrst analyze the case in which the domestic government’s TPP prevails.
5.1 Domestic government’s Transfer Pricing Policy prevails
In this case, although a partial indigenization policy per se does not ex-ante allocate control to the
local ﬁrms involved in the JV16, we have seen that it does in equilibrium. Very importantly, this
16This statement holds if one agrees that there is no formal relation between ownership and control.
14means that partial and full indigenization are equivalent in this case, since they both allocate control
to the local partners.
So far, what we have done is to take indigenization policy (namely partial) as exogenous, and
analyze the eﬀect of this policy on control, as well as discussing the welfare eﬀect of marginal variations
in the level of ownership restriction that do not aﬀect control. However, what is the gain from
indigenization (if any) in the ﬁrst place? To provide a rationale for indigenization, one has to compare
the situation pre and post indigenization. This is what we are going to do now. It is quite obvious
that the pre-indigenization era is characterized by full control by the MNE (usually through fully-
owned subsidiary). We therefore need to analyze the diﬀerent parties’ behavior under this scenario
characterized by ex-ante production control by the MNF.
Referring to the endogenous control case, we know that when q = qd, then government Gd’s social
welfare is then convex and strictly increasing in the transfer price (see appendix A2). This means that
Gd has incentive to set the highest transfer price17. However, some highly arbitrary transfer prices
clearly will be perceived as unacceptable. For many reasons, it is fairly reasonable to assume that Gd
will dictates a transfer price that leaves the JV with a before-tax proﬁt equal to zero18.
We assume that when making zero proﬁt, the JV does not pay any tax. If the JV were to make
negative proﬁts, it would just not buy the intermediate good in the ﬁrst place. In the ﬁrst stage of
the game, government Gd’s program is therefore
max
t
Swd =(t − θ)qd(t)
s.t. R(qd) − tqd ≥ 0





The optimal transfer price would then equal the market price, as it was also the case under Semi
Indigenization 19





= t > θ (8)
The coincidence between tFC
d and t is easily explained. tFC
d is equal to the market price P(qd),
and so is the transfer price under output level qf under indigenization. Therefore, we necessarily have
qd(tFC
d ) = qf(tFC
d ), which correspond to the deﬁnition of t. It is interesting to note that although
17These corner solutions are common in much of the work on international transfer pricing.
18Overinvoicing transfer prices to show no proﬁt or even losses is a commonly reported practice for MNFs in developing
countries. If this can happen, it is necessarily because the domestic country’s TPP allowed such high transfer prices.
In our model, this congruence between the domestic authority and the MNF also occurs in that they share the same
optimal transfer pricing policy.
19Note that it corresponds to the (accepted) Resale Price method, which consist of taking the reseller (JV)’s ﬁnal
price, and deducting a proﬁt margin that any independent seller would make. In absence of an independent reseller
(recall that the JV is a monopolist), the only margin available is that of the JV itself. Since the JV sells at marginal
cost, its margin is zero, and the Resale Price transfer price would just equal the market price.
15under both regimes the JV makes the same before-tax proﬁt equal to zero, the MNF ends up setting
a lower transfer price under Partial Indigenization than under Semi or Full Indigenization.
Substituting tFC




Social welfare in country f is then (recall that tax revenues and the ﬁrm’s after-tax proﬁts are





= aqd − (b/2)q2






Social welfare in country d is given by
SWd = (td − θ)qd












A ﬁrst interesting result that emerges is the following
Proposition 3 Assume that when facing incentives for high transfer pricing, the domestic government
(MNF) will set a price that leaves the JV with no before-tax proﬁts. Under full control by the MNF,
the transfer price set by the domestic government is increasing in δ. Social welfare in the foreign
(domestic) country is decreasing (increasing) in δ.
Proof. Simple derivation of the relevant variables
This proposition provides a ﬁrst hint about the desire for indigenization. Indeed, by reducing δ
under the full control case, the foreign government can limit the capital ﬂy implied by high transfer
prices. Since a lower transfer price is synonym of lower cost and hence higher eﬃciency for the
JV, indigenization policy increases welfare in the foreign country, at the expense of the domestic
country. When the MNF controls production, a lower transfer price implies a decrease in its supply
of input. Both the (transfer) price and quantity eﬀects imply a decrease of transfer pricing revenues,
and therefore a decrease in proﬁts for the MNF and welfare for the domestic country. A natural
question for the foreign country is then why not restrict foreign ownership share to a minimal level.
Three answers can be provided. Firstly, by restricting δ to a very small level, MNFs may ﬁnd it
uninteresting to enter the JV in the ﬁrst place. Even if they do, having little equity means that they
16bring in the country little FDI. Therefore, this policy may not be interesting for all parties in the
JV, especially the foreign government which crucially needs and want to encourage FDI. Secondly,
as our model predict, if ownership restriction is intended at shifting control to local partners without
any other welfare eﬀects, high restrictions are not necessary , but just a minimal amount that would
provide them with enough bargaining power to veto an MNF’s production decision that clearly does
not beneﬁt the JV. Thirdly,...
Lemma 3 Proposition 3 is technically true, conceptually not always true
The above lemma is at the heart of this paper’s concern. Technically, by looking at the derivatives
of the variables analyzed, proposition 3 holds. However, it has to be interpreted with care. One might
be tempted to say that any restriction on δ improves welfare in the foreign country. This is not always
true. This means that, yes foreign welfare is improved by restricting δ, but only as long as the MNF
unambiguously have control over the JV. Using our terminology, indigenization is beneﬁcial as long
as it is partial. When it is more than partial, then we are analyzing the wrong model. Indeed, in
restricting further δ, the MNF’s grip on control is reduced, for the beneﬁt of the local partners to the
JV. Therefore, for some value of δ, it is not clear who is making decisions. It could well be that for some
restriction, control is not exercised by anyone party in particular, or switches to the local partners of
the JV, in which case q = qf. We would then be in a diﬀerent model in which any further restriction
on δ may actually makes the foreign country worse oﬀ. Loosely speaking, the model is discontinuous
in δ. When δ is restricted to some intermediate level, then we are in the Semi Indigenization model.
If it is further restricted to a minimal level, then we are in the Full Indigenization model (which in
equilibrium is equivalent to Semi Indifgenization).
Proposition 4 Assume that when facing incentives for high transfer pricing, the domestic government
(MNF) will set a price that leaves the JV with no before-tax proﬁts. Compared to the scenario of Partial
Indigenization, Semi or Full Indigenization strictly deteriorates (improves) social welfare in the foreign
(domestic) country.
Proof. For the domestic government, Welfare under Semi (or Full) indigenization (see appendix A2)




















4(1 + λδ)2 > 0
For the foreign government, Welfare under Semi (or Full) indigenization (see appendix B) minus







Given that 1 + λδ < 2, which implies that (1 + λδ)2 < 4, the diﬀerence ∆SWf is strictly negative.
Proposition 4 conﬁrms the concern expressed in lemma 3. Proposition 3 established that under full
17control, an ownership restriction improves welfare in the foreign country. Proposition 4 states that
this is true as long as the MNF still control the JV. Therefore, Proposition 4 provides the third answer
to the question raised earlier: a maximal restriction on δ undeniably switches control to local partners,
and makes the foreign country worse oﬀ.
The intuition for proposition 4 is the following. Under Partial Indigenization, the optimal output
has the same properties as the the optimal output under Semi Indigenization, in that they both yield
marginal cost pricing in the foreign ﬁnal market. Therefore, with respect to partial indigenization,
there is only one factor which can make welfare under Semi Indigenization diﬀerent, i.e. the transfer
price. This latter is higher under Semi Indigenization than under Partial Indigenization, as td > tFC
d =
t. Therefore, under Semi Indigenization, the JV is more ineﬃcient than under Partial Indigenization,
which implies a lower welfare for the foreign country.
Corollary 1 The optimal national ownership restriction δ∗is the minimal ownership for which the
MNF still has full control over the JV
More surprising is the following result
Corollary 2 With respect to Partial Indigenization, Semi or Full Indigenization strictly increases the
MNF’s before-tax proﬁt.
This result is very counterintuitive. Indeed, one would expect the MNF to be better oﬀ when (i) it
has full control, (ii) it has a higher ownership in the JV. However, the corollary is not surprising in view
of the fact that td > tFC
d = t. There are two ways to achieve zero proﬁts for the JV. Under Semi or
Full Indigenization, the MNF does not control production, and therefore it (the domestic government)
has a higher degree of freedom for transfer pricing. Under Partial Indigenization, the MNF decides
how much to sell, and this constrains the domestic government’s transfer pricing. Therefore, when
the MNF (domestic government) can set the transfer price, both are better oﬀ when the MNF holds
the JV at arm’s length. Svejnar and Smith (1984) report that “Interestingly, Armand Hammer,
Chairman of Occidental Petroleum, recently claimed that after the required sale of 51 percent of its
Mexican subsidiary the proﬁt on the remaining 49 percent was higher than previous proﬁt under full
ownership. (New York Times, Op Ed page, Jan.5, 1981)”. This is exactly the above corollary. Svejnar
and Smith’s results are consistent with this fact, because the authors argue that ownership distribution
is irrelevant in sharing proﬁts. All what matters is the bargaining power of the parties in negotiating
transfer prices. Corollary 2 also goes in favor of Svejnar and Smith’s argument.
The result that Semi or Full Indigenization deteriorates the foreign country’s welfare is obtained
under the assumption that the domestic government’s TPP prevails. As we shall see later, this result
is aﬀected if one assumes that the foreign government can impose its transfer pricing rule.
5.2 Foreign government’s Transfer Pricing Policy prevails
In the previous subsection, we have assumed that the domestic government’s transfer pricing policy
prevails. However, governments of developing countries would also like to have a grip on transfer
pricing. Indeed, when the country’s TP rule prevails, welfare can be expected to be higher than when
the domestic TPP prevails. Many developing countries have by now implemented transfer pricing
policies or are in the process of doing so. We have seen that the transfer pricing policy of the domestic
18country takes the form of cost-plus or something that could be assimilated to the resale price method,
both methods being accepted by many transfer pricing regulations. Now, let us take a closer look at
the optimal transfer pricing policy of the foreign government.
As before, we ﬁrst analyze the pre-indigenization period. Since the MNF has total control, the
transfer pricing policy of the foreign government will be the same as in the endogenous case (in which
control was exerted by the MNF in equilibrium), i.e. tf.
Proposition 5 Assume that the TPP of the foreign country prevails. Under Partial or Semi Indig-
enization (the two are equivalent in equilibrium), social welfare in the foreign country is higher than
under any control mode when the domestic TPP prevails. The foreign government sets a transfer price
higher than marginal cost iﬀ δ < 1/3λ!
Proof. Under the domestic TPP, we have seen that the highest welfare is obtained under full control
by the MNF, and equals
(a−θ)2
2b(1+λδ)2. The diﬀerence between welfare under foreign TPP (see appendix
A1) and welfare under domestic TPP is then
∆SWf =
(a − θ)2




where δ ≤ δ0. Indeed, we reasonably assume that when in full control, the MNF has at least as much
ownership than it has when no party has full control.
As (1 − λδ)(1 + 3λδ) = 1 + 2λδ − 3λ2δ2, and (1 + λδ0)2 = 1 + 2λδ0 + λ2δ
02, we have ∆SWf > 0
As for the transfer price, from equation (15) which deﬁnes tf, it is obvious that tf > θ iﬀ λδ < 1/3.
This is true because qd(tf) > 0 from (20).
Under Partial or Semi Indigenization, the foreign country has more instruments when it can con-
trol transfer pricing, and this leads to higher welfare. This therefore provides the foreign country
with incentives to have its own TPP. However, having its own regulation is not synonym of imposing
them at international level. A necessary (but not suﬃcient) condition is that these regulations are
consistent with currently observed regulations. While the domestic country always sets a cost-plus
policy20 , the foreign country’s optimal policy would be a ”cost-minus” policy if the MNF’s ownership
share is high enough, i.e greater than 1/3λ. Such a transfer price can be reasonably though oﬀ as
unreasonable21. It is only under certain ownership restriction (δ < 1/3λ) that the foreign country’s
optimal policy becomes consistent (not necessarily equal) with the domestic government’s TPP. There-
fore, another rationale for indigenization policy can be the need to conciliate developing countries’s
welfare-maximization objectives with those of having an attractive and acceptable transfer pricing
policy if the country wants to impose its transfer pricing rule.
What we have proven so far is the fact that under Partial or Semi Indigenization, the foreign
country is better oﬀ when its TPP prevails. However, recall that under both modes, control lies with
20This was the case under full control by the MNF, but also in the Partial (or Full) Indigenization case; indeed, in the
latter scenario, the transfer price then derived was t
d =
a+θ
2 = θ +
a−θ
2 > θ.
21The literature on transfer pricing also backs this statement. For example in Samuelson (1982), an MNF sets its
transfer price subject to an arm’s length constraint that it has to be greater than marginal cost. In Elitzur and Mintz
(1996), the regulating government imposes a transfer price of the form (1+k) times the marginal cost, where k > 0.
19the MNF. Again, a natural question is wether full indigenization does not improve welfare even more.
For this, we need to analyze the foreign country’s optimal policy when q = qf. Refereing to the
endogenous case, we know that government Gf’s social welfare is then convex and strictly decreasing
in the transfer price. This means that it has incentive to set the lowest allowable transfer price.
However, if again, one agrees that cost-minus transfer pricing is not acceptable, the optimal transfer
pricing policy of the foreign government will be marginal cost pricing. Again, we assume that in this





Since social welfare in country d is tax on transfer pricing revenues, it is equal to zero. Therefore
Proposition 6 Assume that the foreign country can impose its TPP, at the condition that it dictates
at least marginal cost (this impose δ < 1/3λ under partial indigenization). The following ranking can
then be established for the foreign country’s welfare
Full indigenization > Partial/Semi indigenization > Any control mode under domestic TPP.
Proof. Proof that Full indigenization > Partial/Semi indigenization






2b(1 − λδ)(1 + 3λδ)
But (1 − λδ)(1 + 3λδ) = 1 + λδ(2 − 3λδ) > 1 iﬀ δ < 2
3λ. Such condition is satisﬁed if δ < 1
3λ
Proof that Partial indigenization > Any control mode under domestic TPP: see proposition 5
While under the TPP of the domestic country, the foreign government prefers Partial to Semi or
Full indigenization, proposition 6 establishes the fact that if the foreign government can impose its
TPP, then Full indigenization is the optimal strategy. Therefore, our model predicts that we should
observe more ownership restriction in developing countries which have a credible transfer pricing policy
that they can enforce, and less ownership restriction in countries without or with less enforcing transfer
pricing policy.
6 Policy implications
In the early seventies, many emerging and developing countries have introduced an ownership restric-
tion on foreign investment22. This was the case for instance with India, and also Korea where, “as of
the mid-1980s, only 5% of TNC subsidiaries were wholly-owned , whereas the corresponding ﬁgures
were 50% for Mexico and 60% for Brazil, countries that are often believed to have had much more
”anti-foreign” policy orientations than that of Korea.”23
These restrictions went together with the development of transfer pricing regulations. Still ac-
cording to the same source cited above, “Policy measures other than those concerning entry and
22See Svejnar and Smith (1984) for more on this.
23CAFOD policy papers, http://www.cafod.org.uk/policy/wtoforeigninvestment200305.shtml.
20ownership were also used to control the activities of TNCs in accordance with national developmen-
tal goals: technology brought in by the investing TNCs was carefully screened to check that it was
not overly obsolete and that the royalties charged to the local subsidiaries were not excessive;” The
question is wether these TPP were always eﬀective.
Recently, however, some of these countries have clearly developed sophisticated TPP, with detailed
guidelines and documentation requirements24, following the internationalization of TPP that adopt
standard rules (highly inﬂuenced by IRS 482 code). As a coincidence, the IRS has become more
aggressive in enforcing transfer pricing rules, which might suggest that some developing countries
have become more eﬀective in keeping part of MNF’s revenues through their own TPP.
Also recently, some developing or emerging countries are increasing or simply removing ceilings
on foreign equity. This is the case of Thailand (who removed most ceilings), and also of India who
recently announced that it would rise its ceilings. This change is mainly due to pressure by developing
countries (especially the US), through the World Trade Organization. For example, according to the
same source cited here-above, here are some examples of requests coming from the EU:
Chile is being asked to drop its rule that foreign investors should employ 85% of staﬀ of Chilean
nationality, when the US formerly insisted on 100% US nationality. Pakistan is being pressured
to drop its requirement of maximum foreign equity participation of 51%, when Japan put a 50%
ceiling on foreign ownership of 33 key industries.
Obviously, developing countries have suddenly become unhappy about these restrictions, while
these have been set a long time ago. There might be many reasons for this, but let me try to provide
one explanation, in view of my model.
According to our model, if by the past, (say) India’s TPP were ineﬀective, meaning the US TPP
prevailed, then we have seen that India would prefer partial indigenization, which is a welfare loss for
the US, compared to full US ownership. Then it makes sense for the US to put pressure in order to lift
these restrictions. However, in some sectors, India limit foreign ownership to 49 or 50 percent, which
constitutes more than a partial indigenization. One may then ask why India implemented this Semi
indigenization in the ﬁrst place, as we know that its optimal policy should be partial indigenization?
An obvious answer is that either (i) the Indian government failed to identify the discontinuity of the
model, i.e ignored lemma 3, or (most likely) (ii) thought that it would be able to (and eﬀectively
did) enforce its own TPP. In case (i), the Indian government could adjust the situation by raising the
ceiling (it actually did over time). In case (ii), the US government should exert pressure to lift the
ceilings. Indeed, when developing countries have some bargaining power, in that they can implement
and enforce their TPP, they increase their welfare at the expense of the developing countries and
their MNFs. These latter will then be better oﬀ by returning to a situation of full control by the
MNF, which again may explain the pressure exerted on developing countries to remove foreign equity
ceilings.
7 Conclusion and remarks
In this paper, I have tried to provide a rationale for indigenization, and the motives behind governments
to implement or remove such policies. One of the main lessons from our model is that in absence of
24See for example the web site of the Indian ﬁnance minister
21a clear control rule, one has to be careful with the assumptions about decision making in partially
owned subsidiaries, for some values of ownership which are neither too close to zero, nor too one. Our
model assumed perfect (and symmetric) information for all players. Although, typically, these kind of
games are subject to asymmetric information, our model provides interesting insights and intuitions
and can be seen as a ﬁrst step to modelling control problems. Our paper could also address the issue
of which government’s TPP should prevail if one is concerned with maximizing joint social welfare.
Although not presented in the paper, this issue has been addressed in the case of Semi Indigenization
(and is even easier to address under other control modes). A supranational authority would obviously
set a transfer price such that optimal exportation coincide with optimal importation, i.e. the transfer
price we denoted t. In absence of such authority, it is found that such decision is dictated by the same
condition as the one that determines whether the foreign government sets a cost-plus or a cost-minus
policy, i.e the relative value of δ with respect to 1/3λ: it is optimal to let the TPP of the foreign
government prevail when it is of the form cost-plus, and let the TPP of the domestic government
prevail when the foreign government would set a cost-minus policy.
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23Appendix
Appendix A: Proof of lemma 2 Let us ﬁrst determine qd, qf and t. Substituting the demand
function in (4), we get
δ(a − 2bqd) = θ − (1 − λdδ)t
which is equivalent to
qd =
δλda − θ + (1 − δλd)t
2bδλd
(9)










For the remaining, it is useful to notice that
bqf(t) = a − t =
a − θ
1 + λδ




Appendix A1: Transfer Pricing policy of Government Gf
If Gf sets t ≥ t, then the quantity exchanged is will be the one decided by the joint venture, i.e qf.












− qf − t
dqf
dt
Using equation (5) which deﬁnes qf, we get
∂SWf
∂t
= −qf < 0 (13)
Given that
dqf
dt < 0, the program of Gf is convex. As Social welfare function is decreasing on the
interval (t,+∞), it is then optimal for government f to set the lowest feasible transfer price, i.e. t.
Social welfare is then equal to

















− qd = 0.
From (9), we know that
dqd
dt = 1−λδ
2bλδ . The ﬁrst order condition now becomes
(a − bqd − t)(1 − λδ) = 2bλδqd. (14)
Subtracting bqd(1 − λδ) on both sides yields
(R0(qd) − t)(1 − λδ) = b(−1 + 3λδ)qd
Taking into account equation (4), we get
θ − t
λδb
(1 − λδ) = b(−1 + 3λδ)qd.








Confronting (15) with (9) taken at t = tf yields, after simple algebra, the optimal transfer price tf
tf =
λδa(1 − 3λδ) + θ(1 + λδ)
(1 − λδ)(1 + 3λδ)
QED (16)
Now, we need to prove that indeed tf < t (proof by contradiction).
We know that tf is the optimal transfer price when the quantity exchanged is qd = min{qd,qf}.
Furthermore, we also know that
qf(t) = (a − t)/b





Now assume that tf > t. Because 1−λδ
1−3λδ > 1, we have from (15) that qd(tf) > qf(t). Because
q
0
f(t) < 0, we have qd(tf) > qf(t) > qf(tf), which contradicts the fact that min{qd,qf} = qd at the
optimal price tf. QED
Now we compute social welfare under the optimal price tf
Firstly, let us re-express qd(tf) diﬀerently than in (15). By substituting the RHS of (14) by its
value in (9), we get
(a − bqd − t)(1 − λδ) = λδa − θ + (1 − λδ)t, (18)
or (after re-arranging)
qd(tf) =
2(1 − λδ)(a − tf) − (a − θ)
(1 − λδ)b
(19)
Social welfare is then equal to
SWf = [a − b/2.qd(tf) − tf]qd(tf)





Equation (16) can be rewritten as
(1 − λδ)(a − tf) =
(1 + λδ)(a − θ)
1 + 3λδ
.





and hence the ﬁnal value of social welfare
SWf =
(a − θ)2
2b(1 − λδ)(1 + 3λδ)
Now let’s compare social welfare under the two regimes
∆SWf = SWf(tf) − SWf(t) =[
1








b(1 − λδ)(1 + 3λδ)(1 + λδ2)
>0
meaning that it is optimal for Gf to set the transfer price t = tf. Notice from (20) that the quantity
exchanged in equilibrium qd(tf) is strictly positive.
Appendix A2: Transfer Pricing policy of Government Gd
If Gd sets t > t, then q = qf. Government Gd then solves the following program
max
t
SWd = (t − θ)qf
The ﬁrst order condition is25
qf = (t − θ)/b,
which, given that P(.) is strictly monotonic, is equivalent to
P(qf) = P[(t − θ)/b],
or equivalently
t = a − (t − θ).
Solving this equation yields
td = (a + θ)/2,
It is then easily shown that
td − t =
a − θ + λδ(a + θ
2(1 + λδ)
> 0.
25The second order condition is −2/b < 0, which is satisﬁed.
26Social welfare in country d











If Gd sets t ≤ t, then q = qd. Government Gd then solves the following program
max
t
SWd = (t − θ)qd
Notice that government Gd will never set a transfer price t < θ, for that its welfare will be negative.
This means that within the range (0, t), the transfer price is bounded in the lower level at θ, and
ultimately to be chosen in [θ, t] (recall that t > θ)
∂Swd
∂t













The program is therefore convex. The optimal transfer price is thus a corner solution. Since
∂Swd
∂t > 0, Gd will set t = t.
Using (12), social welfare is easily determined













Finally, comparing social welfare under the two regimes yields










(1 − λδ)2(a − θ)2
4b(1 + λδ)2
>0
meaning that it is optimal for Gd to set the transfer price t = td. Notice from (21) that the quantity
exchanged in equilibrium qf(td) is strictly positive.
Appendix B Under the transfer price td, we already computed welfare in country d. Under the
transfer price tf, we also computed welfare in country f. In this appendix, we compute welfare in the
other country under both transfer prices (welfare in country f under the transfer price td, and welfare
in country d under the transfer price tf)
Under the transfer price td, welfare in country f is given by
SWf(td) =(a − b/2.qf(td) − td)qf(td)
= (b/2)q2
f(td)














Under the transfer price tf, welfare in country d is given by
SWd(tf) = (tf − θ)qd(tf)
From (15), it comes that




Using the value of qd(tf) given in (20), we get
SWd(tf) =
λδ(1 − 3λδ)
b(1 − λδ)(1 + 3λδ)2(a − θ)2
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